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THE UNIVERSITY IDEAL AND CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION*
DAVID BARNHIZER'"

I. INTRODUCTION

The modem clinical revolution began two decades ago.1 Funded
mainly by the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility
(CLEPR), 2 the initial clinical faculty came to law schools primarily from
legal services and civil rights offices, public defender programs, and other
public interest positions.3 The newly hired faculty possessed professional
* This Article is dedicated to William Pincus, William Greenhalgh, Steven Leleiko, and
Victor Rubino in appreciation for their contributions to my own understanding of the
clinical movement and of the significant role they played in it.
** Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, College of Law.
1. Clinical programs considerably predate ,the Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility (CLEPR), but CLEPR's aggressive investment strategy altered
the nature, scale, and scope of clinical education, changing it from oddity to significant
intellectual and political force. The earlier writings on clinical legal education include
Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic Course, 1 U. CHi. L. Rav. 469
(1933); David, The ClinicalLawyer-Schook The Clinic, 83 U. PA. L REv. 1 (1934); Frank,
Why Not a ClinicalLauyer-School?, 81 PA. L. REv. 907 (1933); Harris, The Educational
Value of a LegalAid Clinic -A Reply, 3 OHno ST. L.J. 300 (1937); Jackson, Trainingthe Trial
Lawyer: A Neglected Area of Legal Education, 3 STAN. L REv. 48 (1950). See also Stolz,
ClinicalExperience in American Legal Education:Why
V Has It Failed?,in CuNICAL EDUCATION
AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE Ftuan 54 (E. Kitch ed. 1970).

2. CLEPR was created in the late 1960s by a Ford Foundation grant in excess of
$10,000,000. By 1975 there were 346 clinical programs in 127 ABA approved law schools.
See SuRVEY AND DitcropcY OF CumiCAL LEGAL EDUCATION 1974-1975 at ii (1975). Led by

its founder and only president, William Pincus, CLEPR embarked on an effective strategy
to cause a rapid expansion of clinical programs in the law schools. By 1973 Pincus was able
to state thatThe growth of clinical legal education in the United States is a phenomenon of
the last five years, due primarily to the efforts of the Council on Legal Education
for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR). More than 100 CLEPR grants to law
schools have encouraged them to provide lawyer-client experiences for their
students.... Five-sixths of the 151 law schools have invested substantial financial resources of their own to start clinical programs, to continue those programs
started with CLEPR grants, or to expand clinical programs in various ways.
Statement of

lliam Pincus, in SELECrED RADiNos iN CLUNCAL LEGAL EDUCATION at i

(1973).
3. The backgrounds of clinical faculty with ten or more years of experience listed in
Association of American Law Schools, Directory of Law Teachers show that clinical faculty
emerged from a different milieu than their more traditional colleagues. See Assoc. oF AM.
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experiences and attitudes that differed significantly from most of their
4
more traditional academic colleagues.
Until the mid-to-late 1960s, American law schools were trapped in an
intellectual time-warp. Other than a brief burst of energy by the Legal
Realists, and the Langdellian revolution itself, American legal education
and legal scholarship had changed little over the span of a century.
Clinical faculty, however, helped generate a fundamental and still
unfolding reformulation of the law schools. An essential element of the
clinical message was the insistence that social justice, legal skills, and
professional responsibility were critical and legitimate elements of
teaching and legal scholarship ten years before these themes became
reasonably commonplace parts of mainstream teaching and scholarship.
Clinical faculty built new programs and courses, forced politics and
other disciplines into the law schools, and experimented with new subject
matters, learning environments, teaching methodologies, and educational
goals. Their activities helped produce a revolution within American law

schools, which has radically transformed law schools over a span of only
twenty years.5 As part of their efforts, clinical faculty also brought a
different kind of legal reality into the law school curriculum. Alfred
Conard, traditionally a teacher of corporation law at Michigan, described
how his brief experience in Michigan's clinical program differed from his
ordinary teaching, allowing him to better evaluate the quality of social
LAW ScHoois, DiRCroRY oF LAw T"?cHms 1988-89 (1988). Most clinical faculty hired
during the first decade of the modem clinical movement came from legal services
backgrounds, did not hold significant editorial positions on law review, did not have
experience with a prestigious law firm, and did not hold a significant judicial clerkship.
Those who were hired substantially prior to the onset of the clinical movement, roughly
1967-68, were excluded. Those listed with more than ten years of clinical teaching
experience or who have more than ten years of experience, or who were involved as faculty
in the early years of the clinical movement, and who have worked with legal services
number at least sixty-one law faculty. An additional twenty-nine clinical faculty came to law
schools from other public interest positions, such as the NAACP, public defender offices,
civil rights, or government. At least thirty-nine law faculty, not all of them clinical, were
Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyer Fellows from the 1969 Reggie class; thirty-one
have come from Georgetown's Prettyman Program; thirty-four from Temple's graduate law
program, twelve from Harvard's clinical program, and nine from Chicago's Mandel Clinic.
While this listing is not exhaustive and there are overlaps between some of the categories,
it reveals the dominance of the legal services/public interest ethic in the first phase of the
modem clinical movement.
4. Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 927, 963. "One traditional career route for the legal scholar is from a
high-ranking position in his law school class (preferably at a prestigious school and with law
review experience), to a judicial clerkship and then to an assistant professorship in a law
school."
5. See generally Barnhizer, The Revolution in American Law Schools, 37 CLty. ST. L.
Rev. 227 (1989).
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justice in America:
I saw and talked with scores of accused persons, and learned
from their mouths what they experience, or think that they
experience, at the hands of complainants, police and prosecutors.
I refreshed and updated my observation of the usual behavior and
reactions of judges, bailiffs, clerks, jurors, prosecutors, private
attorneys, clients and witnesses. What . . . [these experiences]
enhance is my competence to evaluate the quality of justice in
American society, and the possible ways of ameliorating its
quality. The clinic provides a worm's eye view of justice which is
very different from that of the usual "real world" exposures of
law professors. 6
A. The Primaty Clinical Themes
The themes, characteristics, and goals of clinical faculty differed
greatly from those reflected in the mainstream law school world of the
1960s. Nearly every clinical law teacher hired during the first decade of
the clinical revolution emerged from a public interest advocacy
background, including legal services, civil rights organizations, public
defender offices, and government agencies.? In a very brief span of time,
American law schools almost inadvertently recruited a critical mass of
public interest advocates who were intent on changing the nature of the
schools themselves, and the legal profession, to reflect a vision of social
justice that was often inchoate, fragmented, and unexplored. The rapid
influx of aggressive public interest advocates contributed significantly to
the substantial changes that law schools have experienced in the past
decade. The themes that clinical faculty brought to law schools are central
to the changes, although paradoxically, clinical faculty have often not
been the ones who have developed and extended the themes.
The primary themes that have characterized the work of clinical
faculty include:
(1) the importance of developing and implementing practical
conceptions of justice;
(2) seeking to develop new forms of knowledge, particularly
those relevant to basic law practice;

6. Conard, Letter from the Law Clinic, quoted in CLEPR:
1973-1974, at 18 (1974).
7. See supra note 3.

THuRD BIENNIAL REPORT
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challenging the extreme formalization
neutrality of traditional legal education;
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and professed

(4) providing legal services to disadvantaged groups, and
instilling in law students a desire to help the disadvantaged
throughout their professional careers;
(5) a desire to teach law students the practical skills of law
practice;
(6) an interest in teaching professional and/or moral values to
law students;
(7) the responsibility of law faculty to challenge courts,
legislatures, administrative agencies, and political executives
concerning actions that appear unjust;
(8) a desire to socially "engineer" American society, primarily
to reflect the liberal political vision of the just society;
(9) a wish on the part of many clinical faculty to combine the
practice of law with academic reflectiveness; and
(10) an interest in researching and/or litigating specific areas
of political/legal conflict.
No claim is being made that clinical faculty were the only ones
committed to such themes. Nor is it inevitable that all these themes
represent positive values that ought to be pursued within the university
law school, at least when ideological concerns and those regarding finite
resources and the need to choose between competing intellectual
priorities are taken into account. Many nonclinical law faculty during the
1960s, for example, were oriented to themes of social justice, anti-poverty
strategies, and issues of social welfare. Similarly, individual law faculty
have often pursued issues of justice through their teaching, research, or
litigation. A steady increase in such justice-oriented activities by
non-clinical law faculty has also been a key element fueling the
continuing revolution experienced by the law schools. Identifying a
specific- set of themes that has been pursued by clinical faculty is,
therefore, not intended to suggest that they invented them, but simply
that clinical faculty represented a crudely coherent critical mass that
shifted interest from what was at the time an individualized idiosyncratic
context to a larger-scale political and programmatic focus.
A clear set of value choices underlies the clinical themes. These
include: (1) the search for practical conceptions of justice; (2) the attempt
to generate new forms of knowledge, primarily of a practical nature; and
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(3) the challenge to entrenched institutions perceived either as obstacles
to achieving the liberal vision of a just society or as engaged in specific
acts of injustice. Although often left incoherent or implicit, these themes
run through much of the work of clinical faculty. By now they have
infiltrated the subject matter of legal research and teaching in general,
suggesting that the clinical movement may have had a far greater impact
on the activities of law schools and law faculty than is commonly
understood.8
B. The University Ideal and the Work of ClinicalFaculty
The fundamental question raised by the practical, political, and
advocacy orientations of many clinical faculty, including their too
frequently antagonistic attitude toward being charged with producing
scholarly work, their advocacy of social change through law, their refusal
to pursue the deeper meaning and context of their substantive
assumptions, and heavy emphasis on the skills and values of lawyers in
both teaching and research, is whether the clinical movement undermines
or advances the ideal of the university. Answering this question requires
that we understand the nature of the university ideal, including not only
the nature and functions of the university but of the university law school,
particularly the American version.
IL THE UNIVERSITY AS SYMBOL
Until quite recently, the American variety of the university law school
had no parallel outside the United States. This is because American law
schools represent an uneasy combination of the academic university and
the professional instruction of people seeking to become practicing

8. Any reform movement of consequence faces opposition from those being challenged.
Milton Friedman has described the nature of the opposition:
When anybody threatens an orthodox position, the first reaction is to ignore the
interloper ... But if he begins to win a hearing and gets annoying, the second
reaction is to ridicule him, make fun of him as an extremist, a foolish fellow who
has these silly ideas. After that stagepasses the net and the most important, stage
is to put on his clothe& You adoptforyour own his view; and then attribute to him
a caricature of those views.
M. FRIEDMAN, THa COUNTERREVOLUTION IN MONETARY TiOiy 21-22 (1970) (emphasis
added). A major part of the impact of clinical faculty has been the adoption of many of
their fundamental themes by other law faculty who were generally unaware that they were
brought to the schools by clinicians or, if aware, extracted what they considered the
interesting themes and applied them to their own work.
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lawyers. 9 Anton-Hermann Chroust, in commenting on this commingling of
institutional form and function, credits Harvard Law School's founder
Asahel Stearns with having created a unique model that Chroust called
the "academic professional" school.10
Combining the English idea of the Inns of Court and of
apprenticeship training with the Continental ideal of academic
law training,... [Harvard] established the first university school
of the law in any common law country. It supplemented the
Litchfield method by adding a moot court as well as lectures by
a university professor. In this sense it became an academic
professional schoo4 as contrasted with the purely academic law
schools of Continental Europe and the purely professional legal
education prevailing in England.1"
After more than one hundred and fifty years of existence, American
law schools are still caught astride a chasm that separates the Scylla of
the academic university from the Charybdis of the practicing profession.1 2
This unfused dichotomy is both the strength and weakness of the
university law schools. One consequence is that law faculty are subject to
the invisible but powerful forces generated by the forced marriage of
educational forms possessing distinctly different, often incompatible,
orientations. Charles Eliot, the Harvard president responsible for hiring
Christopher Langdell, described the tension caused by the spiritual
incompatibility of what he perceived to be the true university and the
technical school: "In the college, the desire for the broadest culture, for
the best formation and information of the mind, the enthusiastic study of
subjects for the love of them without any ulterior objects, the love of
learning and research for their own sake, should be the dominant ideas."1 3
In the newly emerging technical schools of his day, such as MIT,

9. T. VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LE mNNo IN AMERICA 155 (1969) ("The law school belongs

in the modem university no more than a school of fencing or dancing. This is particularly
true of the American law schools."); see also R. SmvENs, LAW SCHooL LEGAL EDUCAION
IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s, at 270 (1983).
10. 2 A. CHROuST, THu Ris oF TH LEGAL PROFmSSION INAMERICA 197 (1965).
11. Id (emphasis added).

12. Some schools have sought to resolve the dilemma by proclaiming that they are
faithful to the university ideal while most others are not. See, e., Interview with Harry
Wellington, Yale Law Report, reprinted in part in Posner, The Present Situation in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE LIJ. 1113, 1118 (1981) (Wellington's comments concern the "twelve
or so" law schools that purportedly serve the university ideal and the remainder - more than
160-he claims do not).
13. Eliot, Eliot on the Scientific Schools, in 1 AMmCAN HIGHER EDUCATION: A
DOcuMFrTRrY HISrORY 624, 634-35 (R. Hofstadter & W. Smith eds. 1961).
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Eliot saw a different orientation toward learning - a focus on learning
directed toward the achievement of practical ends. There was nothing
inherently wrong in such an orientation, but Eliot considered it improper
for higher education, fearing that if the two visions were commingled
each would be spoiled. The difference Eliot claimed to exist between the
technical/practical approach and the university form was that in the
technical approach to education:
underneath... is a tempter or leading motive unlike that of a
college. The student.., has a practical end constantly in view;
he is training his faculties with the express object of making
himself a better manufacturer, engineer, or teacher.., inorder
afterwards to turn them to human uses and his own profit ....
14
American law faculty have long been caught between the demands
created by the seeming incompatibility of the basic visions and functions
of the university and those of educating aspiring lawyers. Many traditional
law faculty have seen the clinical movement as an assault on their
tenuous claim to legitimate membership in the university community,
presumably fearing that university academics will look even more askance
at the intellectual content of law schools and legal scholarship than they
do now.'s The unexamined Langdellian distortion of the intellectual
perspectives of law faculty has unfortunately tended to blind them to the
potential for rich insights created by the joining of the university and the
education of lawyers. The potential richness lies in recognizing legal
doctrine and process as unique sources of Aristotelian practical wisdom
and insight into the application of power. 16
We often forget our rhetoric is distinct from our reality, and
mistakenly use the rhetoric as a substantive basis for criticism and
evaluation. The standards used by traditional colleagues to assert that
14. Id.
15. See, eg, R. STEVENS, supra note 9, at 270 (commenting that scholars in other
disciplines are not impressed with "the regurgitation of doctrine" by American legal
scholars).

16. These issues are explored at length in Barnhizer, The University Ideal and the
American Law School, 42 RUTGrERs L RLrv. 109 (1989) [hereinafter The University Ideal], and
Barmhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three FundamentalRoles of Judges and
Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PrrT L RLv. 127 (1988) [hereinafter Prophets].
17. The danger and the power of rhetoric has been understood for millennia.
Aristotle offers the insight that: "(1) You must render the audience well-disposed to
yourself and ill-disposed to your opponent; (2) you must magnify and depreciate [make
whatever favors your case seem more important and whatever favors his case seem less
important] ...." Aristotle, The Epilogue, in THE RHEroRIC oF ARmromE 3.19 (L. Cooper
ed. & trans. 1932). Plato asserted that "he who would be a skillful rhetorician has no need
of truth -for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth but only about
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the work of clinical faculty is of less import, quality, or legitimacy often
reflect neither the reality of the university law schools, nor an
understanding of the deeper intellectual content reflected in much of
clinical inquiry. 8 In fairness to academic traditionalists, however, too
many clinical faculty have themselves failed to understand or pursue the
deeper content of their own assertions. Clinical faculty have tended to
advocate themes of analysis that possess great intellectual potential but
have, with few exceptions, done little to advance the substance, quality,
and application of their themes.
For clinical faculty to become a legitimate part of the intellectual life
of the university, they must release the shackles of their latent
anti-intellectualism. Until they do this, clinical faculty have nothing more
than an inchoate claim to participation in the university. On the other
hand, most of the central clinical themes reflect propositions that are
urgently needed by university law schools and that serve the university
ideal if pursued with intellectual spirit. Understanding the functions,
nature, and purpose of the unique institution of the university law school
in America requires a brief historical look at both universities and
university law schools.
III. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE UNIVERSITY IN HISTORY
The word university is derived from "universitas," which means
nothing more than the coming together of many people with common
interests. 9 The earliest Western universities arose during the medieval

conviction ....
" Plato, The Republic, reprintedin THE WORKS OF PLATO 292 (I. Edman ed.
1930). Anthony Kronman, observing that our teaching of law students is conducted largely
in the advocacy mode, asserted that "the most important skill the law teacher imparts is the
skill of advocacy." Kxonman, Legal Scholarshipand Moral Education,90 YALE LI. 955, 959
(1981). He later concluded that "[t]he indifference to truth that all advocacy entails is
likely, it seems to me, to affect the character of one who practices the craft for a long time
and in a studied way." Id. at 964.
18. Part of the difficulty is that the clinical themes and subject matters were for a long
time of such a different character than those of traditional law faculty that the nonclinical
academics felt unable to make fair judgments on much clinical work. Given the increasingly
diverse work of law faculty generally, this worry about legal scholars' ability to evaluate the
work of other legal scholars in a nontraditional area has all but disappeared either through
frustration or acceptance of the legitimacy of distinct approaches. See, eg, Allen, Legal
Scholarship: Present Status and Future Prospects, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 403 (1983). But see
Would This Happen to a Man?, ABA. J.,
June 1, 1988, at 50; Special Feature: The New
McCarthyism, in 1988 CLS NEwsL=rrER OF THE CONFERENCE ON CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(Conference of Critical Legal Studies, State University of New York at Buffalo, O'Brian
Hall, Buffalo, N.Y.).
19. Assoc. OF AM. LAW SCHOOLS, A GENERAL SURVEY OF EvENTs, SOURCES, PERSONS
AND MOVEMENTS IN CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY § 36, at 127 (1912) [hereinafter
CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY].
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period. Included are the universities at Oxford, Padua, Bologna, and Paris.
Initially, these universities were loose, informal groupings of teachers and
students in which the teachers were paid directly by the students in
exchange for sharing their specialized knowledge.20
Universities were creatures of organized interest groups virtually from
their inception. The informal sets of arrangements that initially
characterized the new university communities rapidly became
institutionalized when the Roman Catholic church became the main
sponsor.21 It was in the church's interest to have vehicles for training
people involved in church affairs and to disseminate church doctrine. The
Catholic church dominated the universities in their first few centuries, a
dominance so extreme that Thomas Hobbes felt compelled to describe
English universities as "handmaids of the Romane religion."2 As
nationalism arose throughout Europe, however, and nation states began
to compete with the church for dominance in the secular sphere, many
universities in continental Europe and England came to reflect the needs
of the nation within which they were located. Others were created or
transformed to serve the interests of the varied Protestant sects that
sprang up as by-products of the Reformation. Both the old universities,
and new varieties of the university that were created to advance national
scientific interests, became instruments for the furtherance of state, class,
and religious interests. 23
Modem European assumptions about the university include the
following:
(1) the university is properly subordinate to the state;
(2) the university serves properly as the voice of the national
spirit or the mind of the nation; and
(3) the university is properly dedicated to the increase of
knowledge as its principal task rather than to the mere
perpetuation of an inherited store of knowledge. 24
In America, five primary roles have been described for the modem

20. See id.; see also W. ULLmAN, LAW AND POLMCS IN THE MIDDLE AGES: AN
INTRODUCnON TO THE SOURCES OF MEDIEVAL POLmCAL IDEAS (1975).
21. CoNINENAL LEGAL HisroRY, supra note 19, at 127.
22. Hobbes, Leviathan, reprinted in G. CHRisrn, JURISPRUDENCE 300 (1973).
23. Farmer, Nineteenth-Centuty Ideas of the Universi* Continental Europe, in TiE
UNivERsrIY 4-8 (M. Clapp ed. 1950).
24. Id. at 4.

MODEM

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 35

university. These are:
(1) the education of the individual student and the provision
of a constructive environment for developmental growth;
(2) advancing human capability in society at large;
(3) educational justice for the post-secondary age group;
(4) pure learning -supporting
creativity; and

intellectual

and artistic

(5) the evaluation of society for self-renewal through
individual thought and persuasion.25
A. A TraditionalFormulation of the University Ideal
Such pragmatic and functional descriptions of the university conflict
with traditional formulations of the university ideal. Ward Madden, in a
foreword to Robert Nisbet's The Degradationof the Academic Dogma, for
example, makes the claim that the university "is based upon an historic
ideal that is incompatible with many of the forces of modernism,"
asserting that the university is "the last surviving medieval institution, and
that it is now being destroyed by a secular Last Reformation .. "26
Madden claims that the
heart of the academic dogma is the pursuit of knowledge for its
own sake. Knowledge and the processes of coming to know are
good in themselves, and the university, above all institutions,
is - or used to be - devoted to them. To investigate, to find out,
to organize and contemplate knowledge, these are what the
university is all about. They constitute an ideal inherited from the
Athenians, but first institutionalized in the form of the university
during the Middle Ages.27
B. Use of University Rhetoric to Defend Against Change
Rhetoric of the university ideal captures our spirits. Yet such rhetoric
also has a different use than that of urging us to pursue ideals. This
25. THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE PURPOSES AND THE
PERFORMANCES OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1973) [hereinafter CARNEGIE
COMMISSION].
26. Madden, Foreword to R. NISBr, THE DEGRADATION OF THE ACADEMIC DOGMA:
TiE UNv'ERsrrY IN AMERICA 1945-1970 at v (1971).
27. Id. at vi (emphasis in original).
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rhetoric can be used in an attempt to keep clinical faculty "in their place"
by questioning their right to exist within the university institution,
purportedly because of the focus on practice and understanding the law
in action (as opposed to a theoretical law) that characterizes much of
clinical teaching and research. Such strategic use of rhetorical ideals has
been common in universities for several centuries. It is captured, for
example, by the nineteenth century British debate between educational
liberals and conservatives, and echoed in America by the influential Yale
Report of 1828.8 The reformers in England asserted that the excellence
of education was related to its practical utility. Conversely, the
conservatives argued that educational excellence was directly
"proportional to its practical uselessness." 29 In America, the Yale Report
trumpeted that the "two great points to be gained in intellectual culture
are the discipline and the furniture of the mind; expanding its powers, and
storing it with knowledge."-- This result was to be achieved by the study
of classical subjects rather than the "practical" subjects of science and
business (or practical law).
C. The AspirationalFunction of the University Ideal
Plato remarked that the function of an ideal is not to describe reality
in fact, but to offer us standards against which we can judge our
behavior. 31 The fact that the university ideal has multiple meanings, that
it has been used for illegitimate reasons, or in an effort to defend an
orthodoxy's position, does not destroy its importance. Ideals in their best
sense are targets for aspiration that provide the driving force behind our
struggle to achieve a steadily more enlightened state. The research and
knowledge acquisition functions of universities are vital elements in
shaping society.32 These functions are preserved and driven by forceful
articulations of the university ideal. The dispassionate inquiry into truth,
implied by the commitment to such central values as described by Madden
and Eliot, is an increasingly important, yet threatened, need in a world
increasingly seized by subjectivity, self-interest, and greed. Insisting that

28. Day & Kingsley, Yale Report of 1828, in 1 AMERIcAN H-GHE. EDUCATION: A
DocuMENTARY HLotRY 275 (R. Hofstadter & W. Smith eds. 1961).
29. Gillispie, English Ideas of the University in the Nineteenth Century, in THE MODERN
UNwRsrrY, supra note 23, at 37.
30. Day & Kingsley, supra note 28, at 278.
31. Plato, supra note 17, at 430-31.
32. See eg., S. ROTHBLATr, TRADrnON AND CHANGE IN ENGLISH LEBERAL EDUCATION

154 (1976):

The challenge of industrial society was the foremost challenge education had ever
faced, and therefore only the highest form of education could meet it. Industrial
society was new, it overturned all known values and iffstitutions, it moved at a
speed unprecedented in history, and it brought more actors on the historical stage
than had ever before been accommodated.
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clinical faculty honor the university ideal is therefore entirely legitimate.
The demand that they do so in ways that reflect only the definitions long
used by a dominant, entrenched orthodoxy, is not.
IV. THE CLINICAL MOVEMENT AS A SET OF DANGEROUS IDEAS

Paul Goodman, in The Community of Scholars, has described how
orthodoxies use high sounding phrases to undermine challenges to their
dominance, stating that "[t]he Dominican genius for putting out the fire
of a dangerous idea by introducing lofty irrelevancies is still rampant in
the style of tolerant bigotry of our American... universities." 33
The university is concerned, at least theoretically, with the creation
and free exchange of ideas. Obviously, some ideas can be so banal or trite
that, even if they are freely exchanged, the resulting dialogue is essentially
meaningless. Other ideas, however, are penetrating, either at the level of
profound insight, or through their volatile challenge to entrenched dogma,
or both. The thematic contributions of clinical faculty are best understood
in terms of the dialectical effects of the hypotheses they represent or, in
Goodman's terms, the "dangerous ideas" they have generated.34 The
clinical themes have helped develop an emerging body of knowledge that
is enabling law faculty to transcend, extend, and transform the core of
knowledge that had long been offered by law schools.
Charles Axelrod has described how existing idea systems ossify and
how a new language of discourse emerges to challenge the stagnating
system.35 Axelrod's description is essential to understanding the impact
clinical faculty have had on the law schools through their formulation of
new languages of discourse that challenged the dominant conceptions held
by law faculty:
Ideas do not float freely among people; they become rooted in
commitments, ossified and sustained within intellectual
communities; they are cradled among avid sponsors and defenders
whose work relies on their stability. Thus the tension of discourse
refers not merely to the presence of one language addressing
(and straining) another, but to the presence of one language
addressing the inertia of another. 6
Paul Goodman described how an orthodoxy reacts to "dangerous
ideas" which it fears will erode or transform its basic tenets or sphere of
33. P. GOODMAN, COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION AND THE

COMMUNITY OF SCHOLARS

(1969).
34. 1L
35. C. AxELROD, STUDIES IN INTLLEcrAL BREAKTHROUGH 2, 3 (1979).

36. Id.

195
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power.37 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, clinical faculty flooded
into the law schools in possession of a set of "dangerous ideas"
represented by the clinical themes described earlier. These ideas, while
neither fully coherent nor always valid, both threatened and altered the
nature of the law schools. In Axelrod's terms, clinical faculty created a
"cnew language of discourse" that challenged the frozen language
possessed by an aging academic orthodoxy.38
Seldom, if ever, had the law schools experienced such a large influx
of politically-oriented faculty committed to challenging the behavior and
the underlying legitimacy of legal institutions, including the law schools
themselves. 39 The "dangerous ideas" advocated by clinical faculty
challenged the purportedly value-neutral scientific rationalism that had
served as the avowed intellectual mission of American law schools. 40
While the rhetoric of scientific rationalism (in the guise of Langdellian
legal science), as well as the claim to a dispassionate, value-free
intellectual inquiry into legal doctrine, were largely unquestioned by legal
scholars, most academic traditionalists were content to offer these
assertions as the justification for the presence of the American law
schools in the university community. 41 The failure to question the
Langdellian assumptions was sufficiently extreme that it produced an
essentially anti-intellectual environment in American law schools. The
sterility of the rigidly doctrinal perspective was so pervasive that as
recently as 1978 John Ayer was able to fairly describe American legal
scholarship as a closed-universe "backwater of thought" that was out of
touch with developments in fields of knowledge highly relevant to law and

37. P. GOODMAN, supra note 33, at 195.
38. C. AxELROD, supra note 35, at 2-3.
39. The American Legal Realists also represented a powerful intellectual movement
that operated from a collection of diverse theses more than a single unified strategy. See
generall E. GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTCE (1941); LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD &
M. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S IMTRODUCnON TO JURisPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1985) [hereinafter D.
LLOYD & M. FREEMAN].
40. See generally Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv.
L Rnv. 1 (1959); see also Acquiring Social Knowledge, in D. LLOYD & M. FREEMAN, supra
note 39, at 7-13; Auerbach, What Has the Teaching of Law to Do With Justice?, 53 N.Y.U.
L. Rzv. 457 (1978). Auerbach observes: "The contagious popularity of the case method
perfectly expressed the new ambience of the late nineteenth century. Amid widespread fear
of social disorder, American educators, law teachers included, turned for security to
scientific expertise and professionalism, to meritocracy and elite rule." Id. at 458.
41. Contra Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE LJ.1149, 1153-55 (1981)
(describing legal scholarship as "fragmented and drifting," "risk averse," and "lacking a clear
sense of 'our own' [the law school's] mission and abilities"); see also Costello, Another Visit
to the Man Divided- A Justificationfor the Law Teacher's Schizophrenia, 27 . LEGAL EDUC.
390 (1975).
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legal scholarship. 42
Thorstein Veblen was also a harsh critic of the presence of law
schools within universities, penetrating the pseudo-scientific smokescreen
thrown up by the law schools.43 Veblen concluded that: "The law school
belongs in the university no more than a school of fencing or dancing.
This is particularly true of the American law schools." 44 Similarly, Robert
Stevens has observed that scholars in other disciplines in the twentieth
legal scholars to be little more
century consider the work of American
4S
than "the regurgitation of doctrine."
This of course does not mean that Veblen or Stevens, or the many
others who have questioned the legitimacy of university law schools, are
themselves coriect in any ultimate sense. There is a subtle core of
legitimate intellectual inquiry performed by law faculty examining themes
of justice and the practical wisdom of the legal system.41 Most other
scholarly disciplines contained within the university are unable to
understand the importance of this central intellectual undertaking because
it reflects an ascientific method of thinking and understanding, as well as
a complex, multidimensional subject matter to which their extreme
specialization and pursuit of scientific data blinds them. 47
In any event, the American law school has experienced an invisible
but rapid and profound alteration of its content, mission, and focus over

42. Ayer, Isn't There Enough Reality to GoAround?An Essay on the Unspoken Promises
of Our Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 475, 476 (1978).
43. T. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 155.
44. Id.
45. R. STsvENs, supra note 9, at 270.
46. See Prophets,supra note 16, at 129. In Prophets,I described a core of American
legal scholarship as a "unique and legitimate system of knowledge" that, "[ijnteracting with
judicial thought ... generates an original kind of knowledge more closely allied with
Aristotle's idea of practical wisdom than with speculative metaphysics or empirical scientific
inquiry." Id at 129-30; see also The University Ideal, supra note 16, at 164-65.
47. Sheldon Rothblatt describes the decline of the ideal of universal knowledge in the
face of the increasingly specialized scientific ethos:
As long as universal knowledge was the goal of many prominent and serious
members of the academic community, it was still possible to have learned
amateurs in the university world but by the end of the nineteenth century, as the
great comprehensive summas and positivist theories of social development become
less interesting and valuable to scholars, as the newer universities registered real
advances in the solution of scientific and technological problems, the model of
the man of general education was being superseded. While a grand philosophical
overview was still important in the minds of some scholars and likely to appear
as the stated objective of specialties still in the process of definition, most
academics associated intellectual achievement with narrower areas of
concentration.
S. Ro'riwLATr, TkADMON AND CHANGE IN ENGLISH LBERAL EDUCATION 183 (1976).
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the past two decades. 48 Ayer's 1978 comment that legal scholarship was
a "backwater of thought" could not be stated with fairness only ten years
later. A substantial part of that transformation was initiated through
attempts by clinical faculty to understand and advocate the central clinical
themes, at leasf in the clinical movement's first decade. During this
period, roughly 1968-1978, clinical faculty represented a more or less
coherent core of advocates for ideas that challenged and altered the
49
perspectives of traditional legal academics.
The "dangerous ideas" advocated by clinical faculty challenged the
law schools to such an extent that they contributed to what has been
described as a chaotic period in which the post-World War II synthesis of
Langdellianism and Legal Realism began to disintegrate." This helped
produce a condition that Francis Allen has lamented as reflecting a loss
of the sense of "organic unity" that had characterized law schools. 51
Counterrevolutionary Paul Carrington has directed his strategy of
academic challenge against not only the clinical movement but against
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) as well, inviting CLS scholars to depart from
the university. 2 The next section discusses the ideas of clinical faculty,
reflected mainly in the themes of practical justice, knowledge, and
technique.

48. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L REv. 392 (1971), sums up the
main criticisms of traditional legal teaching methods during the early years of the clinical
movement. "Socratic teaching has been attacked as infantilizing, demeaning, dehumanizing,
sadistic, a factor for promoting hostility and competition among students, self-serving, and
destructive of positive ideological values." Id. at 407.
James B. Taylor addresses this point in discussing an interview he conducted with a
group of law students. "As for questions of morality, justice, and human feelings, we were
told that a stock answer was provided by some faculty members: 'If you want to talk about
that, the school of religion is just down the street."' Taylor, Law School Stress and the
"DeformationProfessionelle",27 J. LFGAL EDUC. 251, 265 (1975).
49. Clinical faculty responded to this dehumanizing approach to education by
structuring their programs to "rehumanize" the world of law students and, almost
coincidentally, that of the practicing bar. James Collins captures the stakes of the struggle:
A dehumanized society is one in which the primacy of being over having is
reversed, and hence in which the person is reduced in significance to the function
he performs in the world of goods and services. Since another individual can do
the same service, the given man has no distinctive worth. Within the technical
universe, he cannot claim to be unique and irreplaceable, with the tragic result
that he may accept this abstract view of himself as final.
J. Cou iNs, CRoSSRoADS iN PHuosoPHY-ExSrmN'mulsM, NATURALISM, THEISTIc REALISM 16
(1969).
50. Cramton, Mhat It's All About. Teaching and Scholarship, AALS NBWSLMTER, Jan.
1985, at 1.
51. Allen, supra note 18, at 404.
52. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984) (referring
to such professors as "nihilist teachers").

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[V'ol. 35

V. THE MAIN THEMES OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION:
JUSTICE, KNOWLEDGE, TECHNIQUIE

A. The Theme of PracticalJustice and Rectification of Injustice
The theme of developing and implementing a practical conception of
social justice has been a significant element in the work of clinical
faculty. 3 This was particularly true during the clinical movement's first
decade, although in recent years concern for social justice has been
increasingly supplanted by the theme of legal technique. The theme of
practical justice is diverse and complex, 4 and involves a commitment to
understanding how law facilitates and impedes progress toward achieving
a more just society.5s It appears not only in research done by clinical

53. See, eg, Ferren, 77Te Teaching Mission of the Legal Aid Clinic, 1969 Aiuz. ST. LJ.
37.
As lawyers try to fashion a more just society, they must take suitable account of
those human situations which put the greatest strain on our society and cause the
legal process to function at its worst. Riots, rent strikes, and the chaos of
destitute families are all manifestations of oppression and alienation which no
lawyer can hope to deal with unless he himself can understand and feel what
reconciliation is needed. This means that lawyers must have broader capabilities
in human relations than our law schools have attempted to nourish in the past.
The only way for students to grow in this respect is through fieldwork, that is,
personal involvement with the application of the law at its lowest and roughest
levels.
Id. at 37.
For a more recent and intriguing analysis of the political responsibility of clinical
faculty, see Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work With the Politically and Socially
Subordinated.Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L REv. 305 (1989).
54. This is made even more complex by the nature of the common law itself. See R.
DAvID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND MEMHODOLOGY 73 (M. Kindred trans.

1972).
English law [common law] was born of procedure, a fact which has implications
not only for the technical form of the law but for legal philosophy as well.
English law excels in the consideration of concrete problems and in the discovery
and application of practical formulae. It shows a distrust for broad principles and
overly abstract generalizations .... English law is not an educating or moralizing
law, but an esoteric, technicians' law... Whatever is unrelated to litigation..
. does not concern jurists.
Id.
55. Pincus, The Clinical Component in University ProfessionalEducation, 32 OHIo ST.
IJ. 283, 295 (1971), advocated the idea of clinical education as a humanizing form of
education:
Clinical education in its confronlation with the individual's share of the world's
headaches, humanizes the educational process. It teaches that while the
professional's intellect dissects the larger problems and places the individual's
plight in the larger setting, the professional's dedication and skill also have to be
used in solving the individual's problems for the sake of the individual and not
for the sake of the answer to the big problem. In the person-to-person helping
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faculty, but in the structure and content of clinical courses, as well as
nonclinical courses and the public interest activities in which clinical
faculty engage.
The commitment to practical justice is, however, inherently
instrumentalist. Due to their nature, experience, and the inevitable
consequences of most forms of the clinical medium, clinical faculty have
always tended to be more activist than academic, more doers than
thinkers.5 6 In the hands of clinical faculty, the undeveloped concepts of
practical justice tend to reflect a commitment to achieving specific
conditions of justice in action, more than concern with systematically
understanding the intellectual content of practical justice, not to mention
philosophical abstractions of justice. Clinical faculty thus have spent less
time thinking about the nature of what they consider to be just than
simply assuming that a particular problem about which they are intensely
57
concerned obviously involves an injustice that needs to be remedied.
This orientation toward practical justice and the rectification of
injustice was both the strength and weakness of clinical legal education
as a political and intellectual movement. The orientation often provided
strength because it allowed clinical faculty to develop intensely focused
and highly energized microstrategies. Yet, while justice (and injustice) are
compelling themes, clinical faculty did not often go behind their own
assumptions to extend the intellectual significance and impact of their
insights to the intermediate or macro-levels of knowledge. Clinical faculty
became prisoners of their experiences, too frequently providing

role, the professional, still as a student, begins to add to his intellectual
competence a feeling for humanity and decency.

Id.
56. John Bunyan commented in . BuNYAN, THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS 85 (Wharey ed.
1928) (1st ed. 1678) on the distinction between saying and doing, concluding:
They are two things indeed, and are as diverse as the Soul and the Body:. For
as the Body without the Soul, is but a dead Karkass; so, Saying, if it be alone,
is but a dead Karkass also .... [Talking is not sufficient to prove that fruit is
indeed in the heart and life . . . at the day of Doom, men shall be judged
according to their fruits. It will not be said then, Did you Believe? but, were you
Doers, or Talkers only? and accordingly shall they be judged.

Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Richard Hofstadter describes the problem succinctly:.
[T]he work of lawyers, editors, engineers, doctors, ... of.some writers and of
most professors -though vitally dependent upon ideas- is not distinctively
intellectual. A man in any of the learned... professions must have command of
a substantial store of frozen ideas to do his work; he must, if he does it well, use
them intelligently, but in his professional capacity he uses them mainly as
instruments. The heart of the matter... is that the professional man lives off
ideas, not for them. His professional role, his professional skills, do not make him

an intellectual. He is a mental worker, a technician.
R. HOFSrADTER, ANn-INTELLECrUALISM IN AMECAN LwF 26 (1963).
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idiosyncratic observations of injustice that remained unconnected and
unsynthesized. The failure of early clinical faculty, including myself, to
fully understand, put into context, and extend their micro-level insights to
larger substantive spheres was an intellectual weakness that contributed
to a period of decline in the clinical movement.58
This excessively specific orientation emerges from factors that include
the nature of the common law itself and. the demands of client
representation. The common law, for example, has been described as a
"problem solving" or "technicians" law, unrelated to larger issues of
structure, philosophy, justice, or morality not directly required to resolve
the particular case. 9 This problem solving character of the common law
helps explain why American legal scholars in general, in contrast to
Continental jurists, have failed to transcend the technical and fragmentary
nature of their specifically defined subset of subject matter, whether civil
procedure, contracts, torts, maritime law, or one of a myriad of other
problems typically before a court. Law faculty maintained this perspective
even though the dimension of actual responsibility for the active practice
of law was removed from their intellectual equation.
Clinical faculty, on the other hand, accepted the responsibility of
client advocacy as an integral part of their academic methodology. This
added dimension creates the risk that the vision of the clinical faculty
member will become extremely narrow when the inherently specific and
fragmentary nature of the subdisciplines of the common law combines
with the intense focus demanded in advocating clients' interests in
individual legal cases. The clinical teacher inevitably becomes an advocate,
and, as Aristotle remarked, the advocate (or rhetorician) is oriented
primarily to the task of persuading an audience rather than that of
understanding or informing. This mirrors Plato's observation that truth has
no meaning in a court of law and that conviction is all that matters.60
There is thus a constant danger that clinical faculty will be captured
by the advocate's version of "truth," failing to develop and combine
overarching structure and general truths that may help us to better
understand the law and justice.61 An equally serious deficiency lies in the
other direction whereby political or client-specific advocacy can blind an
individual to the reality of a case. To the extent that clinical faculty are
caught by the interests and emotions involved in representing a client's

58. See Barnhizer, ClinicalEducation at the Crossroads:The Need for Direction, 1977
B.Y.U. L REv. 1025.
59. R. DAvID, supra note 54, at 73.
60. See Plato, supra note 17, at 292.
61. Ayer, supra note 42, at 476 (asserting that "our legal culture ... provides no
adequate conceptual framework for understanding the law as an essentially human
enterprise").
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interests, their focus can become too extreme, too intense, and too
directed toward an advocate's perspective of achieving the desired
outcome. As Anthony Kronman has suggested, however, this possibility of
distorted perception is a problem not only for clinicians, but for all law
faculty since law teacliing generally is conducted in an advocacy mode of
analysis, critique, and communication which, over time, "is likely... to
affect the character" of a law teacher. 62
Unless the intellectual dimensions of law, justice, and law practice are
carefully and systematically pursued by clinical faculty, the clinical process
and subject matter will become rigidly self-contained, anti-intellectual, and
suffocating. 6 The same, of course, can be said of the traditional
approaches taken by American legal academics, this being the point made
by Stevens' comment about the "regurgitation of doctrine" and reinforced
by John Ayer's observation that American law schools represented a
"backwater of human thought." 64 In accusing clinical faculty of occasional
anti-intellectualism, therefore, it should not be thought that traditional
legal academics are left unscathed. The point, however, is that many legal
academics have greatly expanded their intellectual horizons during the
1980s, while active clinical faculty and the clinical movement generally
do not seem to have progressed, often retreating into technique and
instrumentalism.6
A second cause of the lack of intellectual progress by clinical legal
education is that, during its first ten years, the modem clinical movement
was a political movement much more than an intellectual one. While
intellectual interests did play a substantial role among clinical faculty,
they were subordinated to a tacitly shared political vision involving a
liberal conception of social and political justice, and the desire to create
a new generation of socially responsible, activist lawyers.6 To understand

62. Kronman, supra note 17, at 964.
63. Clinical faculty may have produced their own bureaucratic orthodoxy, closing
themselves off from new insights and opportunities developing outside their closed system
of assumptions.
64. R. SmrENs, supra note 9, at 270; Ayer, supra note 42, at 476.
65. The other efforts include Critical Legal Studies, Law and Economics, Law and
Literature, the Feminist Jurisprudence Movement, and Alternative Dispute"Resolution, as
well as a resurgence in jurisprudential and ethical inquiry, including natural law. See
generally Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 HARv.
L. Ray. 1223 (1984); Barnhizer, supra note 5; and sources cited infra note 75.

66. See Ferren, supra note 53, at 37; see also Pincus, supra note 55, at 295:
It is also important to recognize that there are certain areas where the
intervention of law schools through clinical work is an indispensable element for
improving the administration of justice. For the foreseeable future law students
and law faculty are the only ones who can do something which holds promise,
day in and day out, of upgrading the machinery of justice.
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this vision we need only look to the conditions of the period during which
the clinical movement blossomed, and the backgrounds of the many
clinical faculty who began their academic careers during this time.
1. The Political Vision of Clinical Faculty
Of roughly one hundred clinical faculty who can be identified as
beginning their teaching careers between approximately 1968 and 1976, a
large percentage emerged from legal services backgrounds.6 7 A few clinical
faculty had engaged in private practice, others had been involved in public
defender or civil rights activities, while a limited number of others came
to the law schools from various forms of public interest activities. 8 Few
clinical faculty had been members of, or held significant editorial
positions on, law reviews, had practiced with "elite" law firms, or held
significant judicial clerkships, all traditional paths to law teaching.69
Virtually all clinical faculty conceived of themselves as public interest
advocates acting on behalf of minorities and other disadvantaged groups
in American society. A substantial number of early clinical faculty were
Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyer Fellows who had been trained
to view test litigation as an important instrument for altering the law on
behalf of their clients.70 Others emerged from the California Rural Legal
Services (CRLS) program or from legal services research and litigation
support centers committed to a political conception of law and law
71
reform.
The commonly shared legal services and public interest backgrounds
possessed by early clinical faculty, including nearly all the movement's
leadership during the first decade, meant that clinical faculty moved into
the law schools already in possession of an activist social vision, with
orientations that were far more political than academic. 72 This helps to
67. See supra note 3.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Reginald Heber Smith Fellows included David Barnhizer, Robert Bartels, Robert
Bloom, Linda Champlin, Richard Ellison, Richard Habiger, Roger Haydock, James Klein,
Kenneth Kreiling, Michael Milleman, Lucy McGough, Beatrice Moulton, Steven Pepe, Dean
Rivkin, and Mark Spiegel.
71. See supra note 3. Backup center or CRLS people include Gary Bellow, David
Binder, Beatrice Moulton, Charles Halpern, and Martin Levine.
72. That vision included a liberal orientation toward civil rights activism, an intense
dislike of racism, as well as acceptance of women as legitimate and equal colleagues, the
conviction that government was often a source of repression for the powerless and
disadvantaged, that new governmental instrumentalities and laws were needed, and that law
was a primary device to achieve political change. In describing a "shared vision," however,
I am really attempting to capture the idea of a general state of mind, rather than a common
and coherent strategy. Nor am I claiming that the shared vision was always correct or that

1990]

THE UNIVERSYJY IDEAL

explain why, almost paradoxically, clinical faculty have had a significant
impact on the behavior of law schools, but clinical programs themselves
have remained limited and isolated. 73 Clinical faculty had impact because
they were part of a more or less focused political movement. As children
of the civil rights movement and anti-war efforts of the 1960s, however,
the first generation of clinical faculty shared a naive and superficial vision
of justice that often rejected "intellectual elitism." 74 As a result of their
values, experience, and background, clinical faculty were largely unwilling
and, in a few instances, unable to compete on an intellectual as opposed
to a visionary level.
Because of these factors, the clinical movement was increasingly
overtaken, and then surpassed, by more intellectually driven movements,
themselves propelled by political visions, in which there was a better
understanding of the use of intellectual arguments as strategic weapons. 75
those who held it had sufficient understanding of law, people, political reality, or American
society to be able to make meaningful statements beyond the realms of rhetoric or
abstraction. I certainly did not know enough.
73. The aggressiveness and temporary power of the legal services/civil rights movement
carried over into the clinical movement. When this linked with the liberal-activist
orientations of many law students of that period, a potent, though short-lived, political force
emerged. Regardless of the power of the political idea, the clinical movement was
nonetheless isolated by its political nature. This kept it at arms length from the mainstream
of the law school as well as from the formal institutions of the American Bar Association
(ABA) and Association of American Law Schools (AALS). A more subtle effect has been
worked by clinical faculty who have sought to depoliticize their teaching and scholarship so
that it is less threatening and more palatable to traditional colleagues.
74. Credentialism, grades, and law review participation were regarded by many in the
1960s and early 1970s to reflect illegitimate "elitism;" in essence, the desire to elevate
oneself above fellow human beings for selfish reasons, reasons of prejudice or snobbery, or
as a means of acquiring and legitimating power. John Gardner calls this general attitude of
anti-elitism, "extreme equalitarianism" that leads to mediocrity breeding mediocrity. 3.
GARDNER, EXCELLENCE CAN WE BE EQUAL AND EXCELLENT Too? 16-17 (1961). There is
no question that for many in the civil rights movement the assumption, or at least the
profession, of total equality was an important value. To be elitist, to seek to distinguish
oneself from others, as if in some way "better," was a popular epithet among civil rights
activists. This same attitude was carried into the clinical movement, perhaps not as intensely
as in the civil rights movement, but it still influenced clinicians' feelings about traditional
scholarship and the institutions of the law school world.
75. Critical Legal Studies and the Feminist Critique reflect the strategy Eric Hoffer
called "faultfinding," or the use of intellectual criticisms to challenge an entrenched
orthodoxy. "It is easy to see how the faultfinding man of words by persistent ridicule and
denunciation, shakes prevailing beliefs and loyalties, and familiarizes the masses with the
idea of change." E. HoFma, THE TRUE, BsEvER 127 (1962).
Examples are far too numerous to include anything but illustrative citations. See
generally M. KE2AN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Tushnet, CriticalLegal
Studies: An Introductionto its Oigins and Underpinnings,36 J. LEGAL EDuc. 505 (1986). For
a discussion of Law and Literature, see Symposium, Law and Literature,60 TEx. L REV. 373
(1982). For a discussion of Law and Economics, see Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); Easterbrook, Foreword:-The Court and the Economic System, 98
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Contributing to this problem is the fact that clinical faculty often have
little time to engage in scholarly activities, given the frenetic pace and
continual interruptions inherent in clinical teaching.76
Similarly, many law schools have confined clinical faculty to clinical
supervision, to seminars directly related to their clinical teaching, and to
legal skills courses such as interviewing, counseling, negotiation, trial
advocacy, and alternative dispute resolution. This denies clinical faculty
the opportunity to develop broader, less inbred perspectives on the law
and legal process. As a result, clinical faculty have understandably been
trapped by the limits of the structure within which they have been
allowed to operate, by their own backgrounds, and by the self-fulfilling
consequences of how they are defined by the law schools. Clinicians have
consequently failed to explore and extend their themes of social justice
and unique practical knowledge. Some clinical faculty, unable to focus
only on the traditional clinical concerns centered primarily on teaching
and administration, have left the clinical world to develop their knowledge
and to pursue scholarly and pedagogical interests in themes of justice. 77
2. Rejecting the Neutrality of Law
The themes of achieving practical justice and rectifying injustice also
help to explain why clinical faculty have challenged the long-professed

HARv. L. REy. 4 (1984); Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. Ray. 213

(1985); Posner, The Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L Ray. 281 (1979).
For a discussion of Feminist Jurisprudence, see Scales, The Emergence of Feminist
Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YAL L J. 1373 (1986); Symposium, Women in Legal
Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and Practice,38 J.L GAL EDuc. (1988) (this symposium
issue contains thirteen articles). For general interest or overview, see J.FINNis, NATuRAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); D. LLOYD & M. FREEmAN, supra note 39; Carter,
ConstitutionalAdjudicationand the Indeterminate Tex: A PreliminaryDefense of an Imperfect
Muddle, 94 YALM L J.821 (1985); Schlag, The Brillian the Curious,and the Wrong, 39 STAN.
L. Ray. 917 (1987).
Critical Legal Studies, the Chicago School of Law and Economics, and the Feminist
Critique are the main examples of movements that used the power of scholarship as their
main weapon, as contrasted with the Clinical Movement which was so preoccupied with the
techniques of learning and teaching that its primary substantive messages may have been
obscured.
76. For statistics on the intensity and density of the clinical teaching experience, see
Barmhizer, The ClinicalMethod of Legal Instruction:Its Theory and Implementation 30 J.
LErGAL EDUC. 67 (1979).

77. At the Cleveland State University College of Law, for example, those who have
left clinical teaching and whose scholarship is heavily oriented toward the concerns of justice
include myself, Stephan Landsman, Steven Steinglass, James Wilson, and Robert Catz. See,
e&, S. LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADjUDICATION (1988); Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of
Swift and CertainJustice HasAffected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BurIALO L Rev.
487 (1980).
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neutrality of traditional legal education. Clinical faculty rejected the
artificial and rigid separation of legal and social issues that characterized
the traditional model of legal education even a decade ago. 78 They
considered the claim that law was neutral and that legal, moral, and social
issues could be hermetically compartmentalized, to be little more than a
mask behind which a rigid academic orthodoxy concealed itself.
In fairness, it needs to be stated that the academic orthodoxy that
dominated the law schools lacked self-awareness, masking its true nature
even from itself, taking for granted its own legitimacy and failing to
79
comprehend either its roots or its true nature. Nonetheless, the forceful
rejection of the concept of the neutrality of law that was implicit in the
political vision possessed by clinical faculty, and the substitution of the
concept of the law's political nature, contributed to the forces that
unraveled the dominant academic orthodoxy. This theme came to be
stated far more powerfully, although not without the advocate's distortion,
by members of the Critical Legal Studies and Feminist movements8
3. Other Aspects of Advancing Justice Through Clinical Legal Education
Efforts by clinical faculty to provide legal services to disadvantaged
classes of clients were attempts to improve the distribution and quality of
justice.8 ' Developing a sense of professional morality in law students by
78. See, eg., Wechsler, supra note 40 (judicial review of legislative action must be
based on neutral principles without consideration of social factors). Barrie Thorne has
noted:
The implicit goal of law schools is to create successful lawyers, not to provide an
equitable distribution of legal services. The biases of the practicing profession
are reflected in the law school curricula, in the methods of teaching, and in the
career models implicit in the course of training itself Law school curricula are
oriented to the interests of the rich and propertied.
Thome, ProfessionalEducationin Law, in E. HUGHES, B. THoRNE, A DEBAGGtS, A GURIN,
& D. WILLIAMS, EDUCATION FOR THE PROFESSIONS OF MEDICINE, LAw, THEOLOGY, AND

SOCIAL WFLFARE 122 (1973).
79. See The University Ideal, supra note 16, at 118; Costello, supra note 41, at 390;
Stone, supra note 41, at 1149.
80. See Ewald, Unger's Philosophy:A CriticalLegal Study, 97 YALE L. J. 665 (1988);
Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L J. 461 (1984);
Menand, Radicalism for Yuppies, THE NEw REuBiUc, Mar. 17, 1986, at 20; Tushnet,
Perspectiveson CriticalLegal Studies, 52 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 239 (1984); Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L Rv. 563 (1983); West, CriticalLegal Studies and a
Liberal Critic, 97 YA- L J. 757 (1988); Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L REv. 429 (1987); see also
Scales, supra note 75. But see Posner, A Manifesto for Legal Renegades, Wall St. J., Jan. 27,
1988, at 23, col. 4.
81. See, eg., Ferren, supra note 53, at 37; see generally J. ROBERTSON, ROUGH JUSrICE:
PmsPEcnvEs ON LowER CRMINAL COURTS (1974) (presenting several views on the amount
of justice available in lower criminal courts); V. STRmE, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILS
(1987).
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having them represent poor or powerless people reflected a strategy of
creating in student-lawyers a specific sense of their responsibility to do
justice.82 Given that lawyers comprise a significant part of both our public
and private political leadership, a strategy that attempted to imbue law
students with a commitment to doing justice was a natural path for
clinical faculty to pursue; Similarly, challenges to the actions of courts,
legislatures, and administrative agencies advance particular perceptions of
just action.
4. Assembling a "Clinical Mosaic of Justice"
While clinical faculty had a significant impact, they only created
fragments of an unassembled mosaic of justice. To survive in an
increasingly cost-conscious law school world, and to attract a viable core

82. An exceptional article on this subject is Stone, supra note 48. See also Pincus,
supra note 55, at 287 ("[N]o scheme, however brilliant intellectually, has any meaning if it
cannot be translated into the demands of human existence and individual lives."). Interviews
with students in Georgetown's advocacy clinics reveal that the students understand the
importance of what they are learning in a clinical program. Some student comments were:
We are a model. The court hates us but they concede we are committed to
excellence.
We aren't just lawyers. We want to be as good as possible as a reaction to the
incompetence we see.
The juvenile system is really bad. We think that almost without exception it is
better for these kids if the system does not get them. But we are not just
lawyers and we see the client as a real person. We sometimes almost function
as a social worker because, while we don't want the juvenile system to have them,
we know they need help so we work out alternative placements for our clients
and don't simply put them back on the streets.
D. Barnhizer, An Evaluation of the Advocacy Clinical Programs at the Georgetown
University Law Center 40 (Fall 1981) (unpublished). Student comments on other aspects
of learning through a clinical program include:
We learn to make tactical and strategic judgments and gain an understanding of
howdecisions are made.
Seeing the trial record and having other courses concurrently enhances your
understanding of that other course material. You just begin to see it all more
clearly.
You think more independently in the Clinic than you do in class. We are guided
but must actually do the thinking on our own.
We are actually making new law rather than reviewing old, and this is exciting
and important. That is what the academic faculty are doing in the abstract sense
and we are doing it in real life and supplying the facts. We are seeing how the
law is made.
Id. at 43.
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of interested law students, clinical faculty need to focus on the processes,
values, and actions involved in "doing justice." Assembling their unique
intellectual mosaic will require that clinical faculty more fully develop
their visions of practical justice. They must step back from their constant
attention on how to teach and administer, and concentrate for a time on
the content, vision, and justification of what ought to be taught, and what
needs to be focused upon in scholarship. They must conceive of clinical
programs as symbols and models of justice in action, forcing law schools
to accept their social responsibility by making a commitment to educating
future lawyers regarding their responsibility to contribute to resolving or
ameliorating conditions of injustice.
This does not mean that clinical faculty are entitled to impose their
particular political beliefs or definition of justice on impressionable law
students. Clinical faculty must, in fact, be far more willing than they have
been to explore competing concepts of practical justice, often calling into
question the legitimacy of their own beliefs. In their own way, clinical
faculty have been as intellectually rigid and unaware as the traditional
colleagues they criticize. This can result in an unfair imposition of a
clinical faculty member's unexamined ideological beliefs and preferences
on law students, in unjust judgments made regarding students who do not
share the clinician's beliefs, or a breakdown in the teacher/student
relationship caused by the teacher's intellectual hypocrisy. Given the
public interest backgrounds of most clinical faculty, there is a significant
need for such faculty to test their hypotheses of justice and, through this
process of self-challenge, to extend the quality and depth of their
awareness. There has been too little of this kind of penetrating analysis
in the clinical movement, yet such analysis is the intellectual and
pedagogical justification for the presence of clinical faculty in university
law schools. Because scholarship is the lifeblood and energy that sustains
any movement, whether intellectual or political, clinical faculty must no
longer argue that their responsibilities do not involve scholarships 3 By
winning that argument, they will have destroyed the clinical movement.
The arguments that seeking to teach concepts of responsibility,
humanity, values, and principles unfairly imposes one individual's values
and preferences (the clinical teacher) on another (the student) are only
ill-conceived if clinical faculty, and law faculty generally, have failed to
clarify, test, extend, and enrich their awareness of their own systems of
values and beliefs, as well as understanding the validity of competing

83. We promulgate our visions through scholarship. If clinical faculty reject the
concept and mission of scholarship or confine their scholarship to an exhausted language
of discourse, they will not generate sufficient energy to sustain the clinical movement. It
will become parochial, pedestrian, and circular. For a provocative challenge to the high
priority being assigned to legal scholarship, see Elson, The Case Against Legal Scholarship
Or, If the ProfessorMust Publish, Must the Profession Perish?,39 J. LF.AL EDUC. 343 (1989).
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perspectives.84 Unfortunately, as I have already suggested, both clinical
and nonclinical law faculty have too often been willing to critique others
while failing to apply the same standards to themselves.
If, however, those with experience, reflection, commitment, and
maturity. refuse to stand for integral values and principles, they will have
betrayed and deceived law students about to enter a world in which
principles and values are continually abused, distorted, and pressured. The
principles and values which need to be professed openly are those
involved in developing a personal sense of justice and integrity.as As noted
above, however, the point is not to 'proselytize law students into accepting
the law teacher's personal vision of justice but to assist students, in fact
to demand that students become aware of their responsibility to do justice
and the need to develop their own reflective system of justice.
Law faculty have the obligation to insist that students pursue the
concerns of justice and their professional responsibility because justice is
not simply an intriguing intellectual issue, but is a fundamental part of
the stability of any society.86 Force can substitute for justice to some
extent in dictatorial or autocratic societies, but in democratic societies it

84. Stevens, Preface, 1977 B.Y.U. L REy. 689, 692, criticized my article Clinical
Educationat the Crossroads:The Need forDirection,supra note 58, by assailing the assertion
that clinical legal education properly existed to teach values and professional responsibility.
In his attempt to defend his particular vision of the university, Stevens both misinterpreted
my point and revealed the prejudices of his Oxford education in that his apparent
preference is to teach the implicit values of the dominant group without letting the students
in on the game being played. See, eg., Gillispie, supra note 29:
The only important thing ... coming out of the English universities [Oxford
and Cambridge] was the English governing class, and it emerged less the product
of education than of a sort of molding process in which the universities finished
what the public schools had begun.
So far as Oxford and Cambridge were dedicated to anything it was to the
perpetuation of themselves and of the type of graduate formed by their peculiar
social environment - though this was simply what they in fact did rather than a
consciously formulated aim.
Id. at 27, 29.
85. The critics of legal education and of lawyers are legion. A main theme is the need
for just and ethical action. See Auerbach, Legal Educationand Some of Its Discontents,34
J. LEGAL EDuc. 43 (1984); Bok, A FlawedSystem ofLaw Practice and Training,33 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 570 (1983); Gee & Jackson, Current Studies of Legal Education. Findings and
Recommendations, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471 (1982); Hacker, The Shame of Professional
Schools, HARPER'S, Oct. 1981, at 22, Besharov & Hartle, Here Come the Mediocre Lawyers,
Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1985, at 26, col. 4; Gellhorn, Too Much Law, Too Many Lawyers, Not
Enough Justice, Wall St. J., June 7, 1984, at 22, col. 3. Auerbach, supra note 40, states that
"Illegal education has been primarily concerned with instilling lawyering skills, with training
students to think like lawyers. This endeavor required emphasis on process over
substance - on internalizing certain modes of reasoning rather than on the consequences
of reasoning by these modes." Id. at 458.
- 86. ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACH.AN ETHics 259-61 (H. Rackham trans. 1926).
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is not the sterility of law or the reality of brute individual power, but the
viability of justice that determines those societies' ultimate quality and
fairness. Failing to confront people and institutions who are responsible
for injustice shirks the central responsibility of the modern intellectual,
that of "speaking truth to power." 87 Unwillingness to develop such
fundamental issues with law students, both in traditional courses and in
clinical programs, undermines our society's ability to deal with difficult
questions. Given that lawyers make up one of the most powerful groups
in American society, it is vital that law schools insist that attention be
paid to the issues of social justice and responsibility. Rather than
worrying about how they might be "warping" the psyches of law students,
clinical faculty and many other law faculty must focus on the values that
are fundamental to "the good lawyer."88 Of course, they must first seek
to develop valid hypotheses about the nature of these fundamental values,
which was the intrinsic aim of much of the early clinical movement.
B. The Theme of New Forms of Knowledge
Among the primary missions of the modern university is the search
for knowledge undistorted by the pressures of profit or immediate
self-interest. 89 When he described law as a science, Christopher Columbus
Langdell sought to define the function of the American law school in a
way consistent with the mission of advancing knowledge, concluding that

87. Schlesinger, Intellectuals' Role: Truth to Power?, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1983, at 28,
col. 4:
The intellectual. .. seeks truth; the politician, power. And the intellectual ...
can deal with power in four ways: by retreat into the ivory tower, which makes
him irrelevant; by offering expert advice, which makes him a servant; by
absorption into the machinery, which makes him an agent or apologist; or by
"prophetic confrontation."
The "genuine intellectual," Hans Morganthau wrote, "[m]ust be the enemy
of the people who tells the world things it either does not want to hear or
cannot understand." The intellectual's duty is to look "at the political sphere
from without, judging it by, and admonishing it in the name of, the standards of
truth accessible to him. He speaks, in the biblical phrase, truth to power."
88. See, ag, D. LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER (1983); see also G. BELLOW & B.
MOULTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TEE LAWYERING PROCESS (1978); Himmelstein,

Reassessing Law Schooling. An Inquiry into the Application of Humanistic Educational
Psycholog, to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L REv. 514 (1978). But see Condlin, 'Tastes
Grea4 Less Filling" The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45
(1986); Simon, Homo Psychologicus:Notes on a New Legal Formalism,32 STAN. L REv. 487
(1980).
89. Eliot, supra note 13, at 634-35; Madden, supra note 26, at vi.
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if law were not a science it had no business in the university., Since
Langdell, American legal scholars have used the claim that law was
capable of being studied scientifically as the main justification for their
intellectual activities, although the concept of science used by legal
academics has tended to be a largely incoherent mush of nineteenth
century technicism and deistic-like metaphysics predicated on a fixed
rational universe. 91
Regardless of its rhetoric, the American version of the university law
school has often failed to honor either the knowledge mission of the
university or its moral mission, and has been justly criticized for its
failure.92 Clinical faculty have helped catalyze the intellectual revolution
that law schools are experiencing largely because they have "scavenged"
widely to bring the insights of other disciplines into the legal curriculum.
In doing so, clinical faculty have created new forms of practical
knowledge, particularly in areas of knowledge requisite to law practice,
professional responsibility, and social criticism. 93
1. The Breakdown of the Langdellian/Legal Realist Orthodoxy
During his 1985 term as president of the Association of American
Law Schools, Roger Cramton remarked that the "post-World War II
synthesis of Langdellianism and Legal Realism" had broken down, and
that many in the law schools were seeking to create new hypotheses and
patterns for a new synthesis." In fact, the disintegration of the

90. Address by Christopher Langdell delivered Nov. 5, 1866, reprinted in 3 LAw Q.
Rav. 123, 124 (1887): "If law be not a science, a university will best consult its own dignity
in declining to teach it. If it be not a science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best
be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practises."
91. See, eg., Wechsler, supra note 40, at 1.
92. R. ST _Ns, supra note 9, at 270; T. VEBLEN, supra note 9, at 155.
93. Between 1968 and 1975 clinical faculty were the primary interdisciplinary
"scavengers" of the law schools, ranging far afield in efforts to bring new sources of
knowledge to bear on the subject matters of law, justice, legal process, and the nature of
being a lawyer. For the very useful idea of intellectual scavenging, see Elliott, The
Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L Rev. 38, 38 (1985): "Law is a
scavenger. It grows by feeding on ideas from outside, not by inventing new ones of its own.
How borrowed ideas -not political and social theories, but abstract ideas borrowed from
other disciplines - affect the law is a topic scholars have overlooked."
The areas pursued by clinical faculty include ethics, professional responsibility,
counseling, negotiation, interviewing, psychology and social psychology, analysis of teaching
and learning processes and techniques, integrative analysis, and lower court analysis. All of
these are found in G. BeLLow & B. MOULTON, THe LAwYBRING PROCESS (1977). One of the
most important books for clinical faculty was C. ROGERS, ON BECOMING A PERSON (1961).
See also Barnhizer, supra note 76, at 103-07 (an application of Rogers' analysis to clinical
teaching).
94. Cramton, supra note 50, at 1.
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Langdellian/Legal Realist orthodoxy had been underway for considerably
more than a decade before Cramton's observation, suggesting that it takes
some time for messages from the intellectual "frontier" to reach the
existing seat of academic power.
Because it was conceived too narrowly, much was missing from the
legal education and scholarship of the 1950s and 1960s. The early activists
of the clinical movement provided an antithesis to a rigid and restrictively
defined form of legal education. While -traditional legal education did a
reasonably good job of teaching law students doctrinal principles and the
skills of identifying and manipulating legal doctrine, those unquestionably
legitimate pursuits never deserved to be the exclusive goals for a faculty
engaged in a field as rich, complex, and profound as the law and its
practice.
In any event, when clinical faculty entered the law schools near the
end of the 1960s, they were confronted by a largely sterile opponent
whose language of discourse had become exhausted. 95 Clinical faculty
consequently had a relatively easy time making the case that new
approaches were needed. Universities themselves were in turmoil as they
were attacked from virtually every quarter by social activists and their
own students demanding changes that pursued social responsibility and
relevance. In this climate, change was inevitable. For law schools, clinical
faculty were, for a brief moment, on the leading edge of the changes.
Once the criticisms of the law schools began in earnest, the
traditionalists were on the defensive, but only briefly.16 It was clear, for
example, that law schools were intimately linked with the legal profession,
yet the schools ignored virtually all of what most lawyers actually did in
practicing law.97 Law students graduated with little or no sense of the
skills, values, obligations, purposes, difficulties, and values of law practice.
They possessed no educated perception of the responsibilities of lawyers
to their society. Students gained no coherent or useful sense of justice
and injustice. Nor did they understand what law was. Perhaps the worst
deficiency of law schools was (and is) that they failed on both ends,
95. E. GEE & D. JACKSON, BREAD AND BrnrER? ELTIVES IN AMERICAN LEGAL
EDUCATION 1-2 (1975); E. GEE & D. JACKSON, FOLLOWING THE LEADER: THE UNEXAMINED
CONSENSUS IN LAw SCHOOL CURRICULA 5-6 (1975).
96. See, e.g, Stone, supra note 48, at 397-98 (describing traditionalists' response as
"despair and resistance"); Pincus, supra note 55, at 292 (criticizing the reasoning behind and

the results of the traditional approach).
97. Bok, supra note 85, at 582-83. Yale's law school began by offering a full-scale
"practitioners' course," with emphasis given to the "immediate practical needs of future
lawyers." 2 A- CHEtousr, supra note 10, at 191. Josiah Quincy, then Harvard's president,
in dedicating the Dane Law College (Harvard), observed that Harvard Law School was
founded not necessarily to teach different ends than the apprenticeship method, but to
teach the practice-oriented ends more effectively.
Id. at 192.
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dealing neither with the deep metaphysical and structural substances of
law, nor with the applicational aspects of law and being a lawyer. What
tended to remain was a collage of largely technical doctrines taught and
researched at intermediate levels of quality.
Justice Holmes once wrote that law was properly distinct from
justice.9 Holmes, however, was drawing the distinction simply to make a
rhetorical point, not because he felt it was wise to draw rigid lines
between the realms of morality and law. 10° Seizing on such rhetorical
claims, however, more than two generations of law school faculty refused
to think about the contexts and depths of purpose that justified and
supported legal doctrine.'' Similarly, law faculty were content to accept
Langdell's claim that the "scientific" teaching of law was best done by
those without experience in using law.
From Langdell's ascendance at Harvard until quite recently, virtually
no faculty at the "elite" law schools had significant experience in the
practice of law as opposed to research experience involving appellate
level legal controversies gained as law clerks for either the highest federal
judiciary and/or prestigious private firms. Like nineteenth century Oxford
tutors who clung to their vision of the university because they knew
nothing else, such law faculty predictably justified their dominance of the
law schools by overemphasizing the importance of their only type of legal
experience and by rejecting the validity of the vast bulk of law practice,
trial level courts, and legislative institutions of which they were ignorant.
They rendered Langdell's claim that law was a science, that its raw data
were appellate decisions, and that the "legal scientist" or law faculty
member ought not have an intellect clouded by experience in the practice
of law, a conveniently self-legitimating and self-fulfilling prophecy.102
This refusal to pursue the linkages between law practice and law was
simultaneously blind, self-serving, deceptive, and illusory. The curricula of
law schools, and legal scholarship, were almost totally dominated by the
"stuff" of law practice-for example, civil procedure, contracts, torts,
evidence, tax, property, wills and estates-at least as reflected in the

98. R. STEVENS, supra note 9, at 270.
99. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L REy. 457, 459 (1897):
When I emphasize the difference between law and morals I do so with reference
to a single end, that of learning and understanding the law. For that purpose
you must definitely master its specific marks, and it is for that that I ask you for
the moment to imagine yourselves indifferent to other and greater things.
100. Id.
101. See Auerbach, supra note 40, at 458; Taylor, supra note 48, at 265.
102. Gillespie suggests that the "snob value" of classical studies as the general or
dominant approach to education stemmed from the fact that "nineteenth century Oxford
tutors, who were determined to maintain their monopoly of university teaching, did not
know anything else to teach." Gillespie, supra note 29, at 37.
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decisions of appellate courts. Unless they are pursued for their root
meanings and core premises, such topics have little to do with true
intellectual activity, as opposed to admittedly rigorous and useful technical
thinking that is not profoundly intellectual but relies upon intellectual
power. 1°3 Stripped of its pseudo-scientific pretensions, traditional doctrinal
analysis inevitably depended upon practice and technical, practical
concerns. Virtually total dominance of legal academics' teaching and
scholarship by narrow doctrinal rules worked out in law cases reflected
the true nature of the university law school in America, a nature far more
consistent with concern for the practice of law than with either
philosophy or science. 104
The fact that American law schools have been oriented far more to
the practice of law, albeit toward only a particular kind and level of law
practice, than to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, is not at all
surprising given the history of legal education in America. When created,
the law schools of both Harvard and Yale were heavily oriented toward
educating students intent on becoming practitioners.'0 s Chroust credits
Asahel Stearns with creating°6 a unique institutional form, the
"academic-professional" school.' Various efforts had been made in
America to teach law as part of a general university education, but the
efforts failed due to their lack of appeal to practical interests.1°7
Langdell's aim, in addition to attempting to respond to critics in a
university environment decidedly hostile to what was then being
challenged as a mediocre law school, was to prepare students for the
practice of law."' Langdell simply assumed that such preparation could
be best achieved through his "legal science," and that experienced
practitioners would be too closely bound to their experience to be able
to comprehend or teach the scientific structure of law.1' 9

103. R. HosrA mu, supra note 57, at 26.
104. Yale Law School formally started up in 1825 by offering a full-scale "practitioners'
course" with emphasis given to the "immediate practical needs of future lawyers." 2 ACHROUST, supra note 10, at 191-92.
105. Id. at 223. "[lt is a high and unequivocal privilege," Quincy stated, to be first
introduced to the knowledge of what is formal, fictitious and technical, not by the desultory,
haphazard way of official business but by the orderly succession of general principle. Id.
106. Id. at 191, 197.
107. Id. at 176-90.
108. "Law ... consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of
these as to be able to apply them with constant facility to the ever-tangled skein and hence
to acquire that mastery should be the business of every earnest student of the Law." J.
CONANT, Two MODES OF THOUGHT 44 (1964) (quoting C. LANGDELL, A SELEcrON OF CASES
ON THE, LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871)).
109. See id.; see also HARVARD LAw SCHOOL ASS'N, A CENTENNIAL HisroRY OF THE
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 1817-1917, at 26 (1918).
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Thus we see Langdell, whose legal experience was primarily that of
researcher for other lawyers, and James Barr Ames, who possessed no
experience in practicing law, as the first "scientific" teachers of American
law." 0 Regardless of Langdell's attempt to justify the law school's
existence in the university on the grounds of his new methodology, the
purpose of his method was to provide law students with mastery of the
principles needed to practice law better, not to pursue the study of law
in and for itself. This, of course, offends the university spirit described by
Charles Eliot, ironically the Harvard president who hired Langdell as
dean of Harvard Law School."'
When clinical faculty argued that education for the practice of law
was an important part of the law school's mission, they were simply
reflecting the true nature of university law schools in America, since at
least 1817.11 Given the nature of what law faculty actually taught and
wrote about, it could not be true that all practice was suspect, just a
certain kind of law practice.113 The suspect orientations were those that
focused on lawyers' behaviors rather than appellate principles; those that
questioned assumptions about law being politically neutral; those that
emphasized the trial stages at which the law functioned rather than the
appellate levels; and those, such as criminal law and family law, that
represented the "dirty" levels of practice at which law supposedly could
not be practiced "in
the grand manner," a level of practice inhabited by
"ethnic" lawyers." 4 Not surprisingly, each of these traditionally disfavored
"alien" orientations is central to the activities of clinical faculty.
2. The Clinical Subject Matter
Over a very short period of time clinical faculty brought diverse
elements of entirely different disciplines into the content of legal
education. The scope and intensity of the assault were enormous. Much
of the activities of clinical faculty were committed to bringing into the
law schools the world of lawyers, law practice, and law in action at the
pretrial and trial levels, levels ignored entirely by traditional legal
academics. To illuminate the work of lawyers, insights and hypotheses
were borrowed from psychology, sociology, game theory, negotiation,
client counseling, humanistic philosophy, ethics, social criticism, trial

110. See J.B. AMeS, Memoir of James Barr Ames, in
5 (1913);
111.
112.
113.
114.

LECrURES ON LEGAL HisroRy

ChristopherColumbus Langdell, in id. at 467, 471.
See Eliot, supra note 13, at 634-35.
2 A. CHRouSr, supra note 10, at 197.
See J. AUERBACH, UNEQuAL JusncE 102-29 (1976).
Id. at 106-07.
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advocacy and much more.1' 5 To convey their message, clinical faculty
sought to develop a theory of teaching and supportive methodology that

was uniquely "clinical."' 1 6 Running through their work was an essentially

moral concept, or at least a set of. moral assumptions, about what it
meant to be a responsible (good, ethical, moral) lawyer. 17
Clinical faculty created a rapidly expanding intellectual and political
movement that forced a significant experiment into law schools, which
were generally unprepared and unwilling to participate. The intensity,
scope, and "alien" nature of the clinical movement threatened the
self-image and the intellectual security of many law faculty. Committed,
vocal students flocked to clinical courses, with many of the students
taking every opportunity to inform traditional academics of the superiority
of their clinical experiences compared to the perceived dullness of
traditional offerings. Criticisms by clinical faculty of the narrowness,
parochialism, and short-sightedness of the traditional mode of legal
education were often well-founded. Being right, however, has never been
a guarantee of being liked, particularly by those being criticized. Nor were
clinical faculty always correct in their criticisms, in many ways being as
short-sighted as those they criticized.
The criticisms by clinical faculty of the traditional approach to legal
education produced resentment and controversy over purpose among
other law faculty. To some extent, traditional colleagues' resentment of
clinical faculty was deserved. As with any political movement filled with
young, aggressive, largely inexperienced advocates, clinical faculty were
often lacking in what they offered to replace the traditional model. At
times they were too extreme in claiming that the clinical vehicle was the
primary means to achieve law schools' educational goals. In the
movement's early phase, clinical faculty frequently failed to understand
that the traditional analytical approach used by law schools, independent
of its abuses, had much to offer in terms of developing the skill of critical

115. See, ag, Harbaugh, Simulation and Gaming: A TeachinglLearning Strategy for
ClinicalLegal Education, in CUNICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: REPORT OF THE AsSOCiATiON OF
AmEmcaN LAW SCHooLs-AmEmcAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMIT E ON GuIDELINEs FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 191 (1980) [hereinafter GUIDEIFNES REPORT]; see also P.
BERGMAN, TRIAL ADVOCACY IN A NutSHELL (2d ed. 1989); D. BINDER & S. PRICE,
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSEUNG. A CLENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); K. HEGLAND, TRIAL

ADvoCAcY (1978); Stone, supra note 48, at 398-405.
116. See, e., Barnhizer, supra.note 58, at 1025; Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers:
Some PrelTminaryReflections on ClinicalEducation as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION
FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374, 375 (CLEPR National Conference 1973).
117. See Symposium, Legal Education, 53 N.Y.U. L REv. 293 (1978). See generally D.
LuBAN, supra note 88.
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thinking so essential for lawyers, judges, and legal scholars.118 The
traditional model offered a mechanism that was less expensive, though not
necessarily pedagogically superior, or even equal to the proposed
alternatives." 9 What was not well understood among the clinical reformers
was that the structure that had been created by Langdell generated an
economic "bottom line" for law schools that could not be overcome. The
costs of heavily supervised clinical courses simply were too large to be
borne by most law schools for more than a limited number of students
unless funds were diverted from other legitimate areas of the curriculum.
The economic reality of the Langdellian model ensured that, as a primary
pedagogical model, the intensive model of clinical education could not
make significant inroads into the curriculum."0
C. The Theme of Technique
By 1980, CLEPR was concluding its activities and had ceased to be
a force capable of influencing the law schools. Clinical faculty, feeling
increasingly compelled to justify their existence given the combination of
factors that included CLEPR's demise, the loss of the clinical movement's
initial surge of energy, declining interest in clinical courses among law
students raised in the "me generation" of the 1970s, and the static
resources of law schools, chose to focus increasingly on technical legal
skills as the justification for clinical education.1l This concentration on
legal skills altered the nature of the clinical movement., although it may
have been the only realistic choice in the climate of the 1980s. The shift
to a more technical focus and justification was almost inevitable because
it represented a decision by clinical faculty to seek allies among the ABA
and judiciary. Without such powerful allies possessing leverage over the
law schools, clinical faculty would have had even greater difficulty during

118. Many have criticized the processes and outcomes of traditional American legal

instruction. See, e-g, Cramton, Beyond the OrdinayReligion, 37 3. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1987)

[hereinafter Beyond the OrdinaryReligion]; Cramton, The OrdinaryReligion ofthe Law School

Classroom, 29 1 LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978); Himmelstein, supra note 88, at 514; Redmount,
A Conceptual View of the Legal Education Process, 24 3. LEGAL EDUC. 129 (1972); Stone,

supra note 48, at 392.
119. Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in VIII PERSPECnVS IN
AmERICAN HISTORY 403, 415 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971) (commenting that

Langdell's most lasting contribution may have been to lock legal education into an
instructional format involving large class sizes).
120. On the issue of cost, see P. DEL SwoRDs & F. WALWER, THE COSTS AND
RasouRc s OF LEGAL EDUCATION (1974); L NICHOLSON, THE LAw SCHOOLS OF THE UNroD
STATES 73-123 (1958); deL Swords & Walwer, Cost Aspects of Clinical Education, in
GUIDEINES REPORT, supra note 115, at 133.
121. I sought to make this point in ClinicalEducation at the Crossroads: The Need For
Direction,supra note 58.
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the past decade. Nonetheless, the shift from clinical themes focused on
achieving practical justice to those emphasizing technical skills has
Faustian implications that must be resisted.
Whatever its causes, after almost fifteen years of the clinical
experiment, by 1980 there was still only grudging support for clinical
education among most law faculty. Through the 1970s, the lack of real
support for the work of clinical faculty can be attributed primarily to
hostility within the schools themselves on the part of nonclinical faculty.
During the 1980s, however, particularly in the latter half of the decade,
many within law schools opened and reformulated their intellectual
paradigms to such an extent that new ideas and unique kinds of
scholarship became acceptable and even de rigueur. In this climate of
rampant intellectual experimentation and expansion, the levels at which
clinical faculty pursued their themes seemed increasingly pedestrian,
transparent, and superficial.
Clinical faculty now find themselves at yet another critical point
where decisions must be made that will determine the future of the
clinical movement. The law school world of 1990 assumes and requires a
lifetime of scholarly activity as a matter of course, rather than a few
tenure pieces done to satisfy requirements. The unwillingness, or inability,
of clinical faculty to do serious scholarly work increasingly seems
intellectually offensive and a waste of law schools' relatively scarce
resources.
1. The Dangers of the Technical Focus
The theme of technique has always been an element of the clinical
movement, and properly so, just as it has for law schools generally. In The
Technological Society, Jacques Ellul describes technique as the dominant
principle of modem society m Obviously, humans want to be effective and
efficient at what they spend their lives doing. They want their institutions
to work well and "to progress." As a focus or underlying value, however,
technique is a compelling force. In its deeper meaning, the orientation to
technique generates an ethos that relentlessly drives out fundamental
values. Ellul, for example, warns that the steady progression toward
technique is irreversible, becoming all-consuming to the extent that we
lose the ability to see beyond our specialized fields and to communicate
with others.m
To their credit, clinical faculty sought to understand technique in
terms of how it can be modified by humanistic values so that it will not
overwhelm the morality and "humaneness," or human integrity, of the

122. 1. ELLuL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SocI1ry 349 (1964).
123. Id. at 428.
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lawyer. The clinical movement was long committed to understanding
how legal technique distorted the character of lawyers, seeking to develop
learning processes to combat the effects.lss In the second decade of the
clinical movement, technique, in and of itself, has become an increasingly
dominant theme.
Clinical faculty must ask themselves whether their increasing
preoccupation with technique has diminished concern for the themes of
practical justice and knowledge. Technique is obviously a valid concern
for an educational process that serves as the exclusive mechanism for
educating those who become practicing lawyers.us Technique is dangerous,
however, because it progressively absorbs interest in other matters. This
is particularly true for those, such as lawyers, who engage in activities
that depend on technique. Technique can quickly threaten one's sense of
justice and integrity unless it is consciously and constantly defended
against.
The increasing fixation on technique infiltrates most of what is done
in clinical courses. It affects decisions on how to structure, focus, and
teach clinical courses. It also tends to preclude research that would
enhance the quality of intellectual insights. Technique is a powerful and
highly focused lens that reveals a tiny piece of legal skills or legal process
with great clarity. But the magnification of microscopic elements of the
technical process blinds the observer to the larger framework in which
technique is only a single element.
2. Technique is Taught Effectively Through Non-Clinical Courses
Technique is a trap for clinical faculty for several reasons. Clinical
faculty no longer have a monopoly on teaching legal technique. One
measure of the success of the clinical movement is that, if legal technique
is used as the main justification of clinical courses, then the clinical
movement has made itself obsolete. Most of the techniques of law
practice can be taught as effectively through other methods of instruction
than through those based on the representation of clients needing
assistance in the legal system. The learning of legal skills or technique
will therefore never provide an adequate justification for the existence of
clinical courses, particularly when cost, the number of students reached,
the effectiveness of other approaches, and the recognition that law

124. See, eg, G. BELLow & B. MOULTON, supra note 88; Redmount & Shaffer,
Learningthe.Law - Thoughts Toward aHumanPerspective,51 NOTRE DAmIE LAw. 956 (1976).
125. See Stone, supra note 48, at 421-28; Taylor, supra note 48, at 266-67; Beyond the
OrdinaryReligion, supra note 118, at 515.
126. F. ZAMNs & V. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBuC PROFESSION 123 (1981)
"With formal legal education maintaining a virtual monopoly over preparation for entry into
the legal profession, it is assumed that law schools are, or ought to be, the primary source
of the skills and knowledge requisite to the practice of law."
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schools can teach only a limited base of technical awareness to
inexperienced students are considered.
The quality and diversity of materials, the schools' curricular
awareness, acceptance of effective learning methodologies, richer course
content, and experience of law faculty in teaching legal skills and
understanding the nature of the practice of law, have all improved
dramatically in the past ten to fifteen years. As long as technique is the
controlling consideration, other equally good, and generally more
cost-effective teaching programs provide alternatives to the live-client
clinical method. This means that for the clinical movement to not only
survive, but become stronger, its proponents must provide a considerably
more powerful justification than is offered by technique. That justification
is found in the original themes of the clinical movement, particularly
those oriented to achieving practical conceptions of social justice.
VI. CLINICAL AcmvmEs AS TooLs OF JUSTICE

Nearly ten years ago I asked Georgetown's William Greenhalgh what
he considered to be the primary goal of the Criminal Justice Clinic at
Georgetown. He quickly responded, "[t]he goal of the Criminal Justice
Clinic is to turn out young 'ministers of justice' in the representation of
clients and defense of their freedom."'2 Greenhalgh's words capture the
theme that sets the clinical movement apart. It is the commitment to
developing, testing, adapting, comprehending, and explaining a practical
conception of justice in action, teaching law students that the privileged
class of lawyers possess the responsibility to facilitate a just society. The
law schools, the legal profession, and the judiciary all need to be
confronted by models that continually examine what they do in the light
of standards of practical justice.
The primary mission of clinical faculty is to create visible models of
justice in action that demonstrate a deep commitment to achieving justice
and to challenging injustice. This does not mean that all clinical programs
will be alike. It does not mean that clinical courses involve only poverty
law or related activities. Nor does it mean that there is a specific or
unified agenda for clinical faculty concerning what aspects of justice
ought to be addressed or how problems should be defined. I am urging
that the critical element is the process of principled inquiry into
conditions of justice and injustice as actually manifested in real societal
arrangements. This does not dictate a particular political vision, but
demands a willingness to inquire as well as a responsibility to take some
form of action depending on the result of the process of principled
inquiry.

127. D. Barnhizer, supra note 82, at 26.
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This means that clinical faculty ought to commit themselves to
studying areas of need where the application of scarce legal resources
might make a difference in remedying or at least publicizing a problem.
It means that clinical faculty need to design clinical courses with sound,
defensible visions of social justice in mind. It means that clinical faculty
should continue to teach legal skills, but recognize that they are doing so
as a necessary but insufficient condition of their quest to contribute to the
rectification of injustice. It means that clinical faculty should challenge
more traditionally oriented colleagues and students to explore, understand,
and accept the responsibility of lawyers and law schools to be aware of
injustice and to contribute to alleviating some aspect of the many
problems we face. It means also that clinical faculty must seek out allies
in law schools beyond the clinics who can contribute to their mission.
There are several implications of these positions. First, it should be
clear that clinical courses do not exist to teach technical skills, but that
they teach technical skills as a necessary and important by-product of
their basic mission. Second, it implies that clinical courses, as symbols of
the commitment to doing justice, may involve a limited number of
students directly interested in the particular area rather than attempting
to involve the overall student body in a direct manner. Third, it
recognizes that clinical faculty must educate themselves, colleagues, and
students about the nature of clinical courses, and begin to demand a
greater share of resources to fund this increasingly important intellectual
obligation of law schools. Fourth, clinical faculty need to create strategies
that help their courses to better serve this "justice function" and to
develop clearer and more cooperative agendas with similarly interested
clinical faculty, and with lawyers, legal academics, political leaders, and
relevant client groups. In doing this, clinical faculty can design clinical
courses in ways that create resources for other law faculty engaged in
shaping questions of justice in nonclinical courses.
A. "Speaking Truth to Power"
Finally comes the issue of what ought to be the primary intellectual
contributions of those we are calling clinical faculty. The work of legal
scholars, lawyers, and judges is different from that of most other scholars
and university academics. Hans Morgenthau described the responsibility
of the intellectual as one of "speaking truth to power," telling those in
power things they have ignored or simply do not want to hear.Im Clinical
faculty are intimately involved in dealing with those who exercise power
and in its critique. They need to concentrate even more on those
processes and on their ability to confront those in power with their

128. Schlesinger, supra note 87, at 28, col. 4.
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findings, whether through formal scholarship, teaching, legislation, or
litigation. At the same time, clinical faculty must understand the
structurally generated schizophrenia of their multiple roles of client
advocate, teacher, university scholar, and political critic.
B. PracticalWisdom and Non-Cumulative Knowledge

Science involves the control of discrete phenomena. The subject.
matter with which we deal, the law, is not reducible to a controllable
scientific bundle of data but is fluid, multidimensional, metaphysical, and
humanistic, all intertwined in ways that would drive a scientific researcher
berserk. Law is a form of knowledge that fits into the category Crane
Brinton has called non-cumulative32 Non-cumulative knowledge, such as
that which is found in departments of philosophy not dominated by
linguistic analysis, is as fundamental as scientific knowledge but is of a
different character. Non-cumulative knowledge has, however, been largely
ignored by universities since the rise of the cult of modem science.'m
It is non-cumulative knowledge with which clinical faculty, and most
nonclinical law faculty as well, inevitably deal. This includes knowledge
of justice, value, truth, morality, judgment, politics, and aesthetics.1'
Science may create or may inform the controversies but will rarely
provide the answers. Arnold Toynbee has described the dilemma:
Man's intellectual and technological achievements have been
important to him, not in themselves, but only in so far as they
have forced him to face, and grapple with, moral issues which
otherwise he might have managed to go on shirking. Modem
Science has thus raised moral issues of profound importance, but
it has not, and could not have, made any contribution toward
solving them. The most important questions that Man must
2
answer are questions in which Science has nothing to say.

"Important questions" of the kind described by Toynbee are the
source of the "dangerous ideas" that clinical faculty forced into a law
school world that had sought to ignore the true nature of the law.
129. C. BRiNToN, IDEAS AND MEN 12-14 (1950). "Cumulative knowledge is best
exemplified by the knowledge we call commonly natural science, or just science." Id. at 12.
"Noncumulative knowledge can here be illustrated best from the field of literature." Id. at
13. This distinction "does not mean that science is good and useful, and that art, literature,
and philosophy are bad and useless, but merely that in respect to the attribute of
Id. at 14.
cumulativeness they are different ....
supra
note
47, at 183.
130. See S. RoTmBLATr,
at
194-96.
supra
note
16,
See
Prophets,
131.
132. A. ToYNBEF, A STUDY OF HiroRY 99-100 (Abr. ed. 1957).

NEW YORK L4W SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

Clinical research into humanistic themes, the personality and role of
lawyers, the justice and injustice of real legal processes, and the basic
dignity of humans caught within the machinery of law, has enriched the
law schools and served the university ideal in ways that have not yet been
adequately appreciated by law faculty.
The future of the clinical movement depends upon the willingness of
clinical faculty to continue to focus and extend their activities in areas
consistent with such fundamental themes. It is a vision that for a time
seems to have been diminished among clinical faculty but that now is
reemerging, not coincidentally, along with a resurgence of interest among
law students in vital social issues after a decade of self-centeredness. The
vitality of the clinical movement depends upon clinical faculty creating
opportunities for law students eager to contribute meaningfully to public
issues of consequence1 3
VII. CONCLUSION

The question asked at the beginning of this Article was whether
clinical legal education undermines or advances the ideal of the university.
The answer depends upon the particular ideal used as the analytic
standard, on the degree of connection considered acceptable between the
university and society, and on the legitimate and inevitable transmutations
of the ideal by the particular mediums of the law and the law school. It
is obvious, for example, that however the university ideal is defined in the
abstract, it will take on a particular character consistent with the
contextual vehicle through which it is applied. The characteristics of that
vehicle, and we are concerned with the medium of the university law
school and the related systems and forces with which it interacts, will
influence the quality and nature of the university ideal, as applied, and
will be simultaneously influenced by that ideal.
Having developed these themes at length elsewhere, I will not
reproduce that work here.'m But understanding the relationship between

133. The clinical movement blossomed with the emergence of socially conscious
students in the 1960s and early 1970s, who aggressively demanded relevance, reality, and
social meaning in their education. As this student attitude became transformed by the
selfishness of the 1970s and most of the 1980s, the clinical movement lost its support and
momentum. Alexander Bickel has noted,
[t]he young ... have their own perception of their needs, and society has an
instrument at its disposal for bringing these needs home; it is the market, inside
the university and out, and in the aggregate, over time, it is quite effective...
. The curriculum of every university is subject to that. The market serves as a
limit on academic freedom.
A BICKEL, Tna MoRALrry OF CONSENT 128 (1975).
134. See Barnhizer, supra note 5; Prophets,supra note 16; The University Ideal, supra
note 16.
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clinical legal education and the university ideal does require that certain
primary points be specified. That is why both traditional and modem
conceptions of the university were discussed in the beginning of this
Article and why it was necessary to sketch aspects of the development of
the university law school in America. Having done that, it becomes
possible to draw some connections between the university ideal (or ideals)
and the work of clinical faculty.
First, it needs to be understood that a main theme of the medieval
university was that it should "embrace the whole of knowledge," including
the "esoteric learning necessary to human social life and necessary also
to the highest development of man as a person."1s Similarly, consider
the description of the university ideal offered by John Henry Cardinal
Newman in The Idea of a University:'3'
That it is a place of teaching universal knowledge. This implies
that its object is, on the other hand, the diffusion and extension
of knowledge rather than its advancement. If its object were
scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a
I do not see
University should have students; if religious training,
7
how it can be the seat of literature and scienceY
Compare Newman's description of the university ideal with Madden's
articulation of the ideal, or the academic dogma, as "the pursuit of
knowledge for its own sake.... [t]o investigate, to find out, to organize
and contemplate knowledge. . . ."M If we take Paul Farmer's description

of modem European assumptions of the nature and functions of the
university and add the variations suggested by the Carnegie Commission
on Higher Education in the United States for the university since 1870,
it is obvious that a variety of definitions exist. 39 It should, however, be
clear that none of these themes is completely or explicitly dominated by
the idea of science as the only legitimate value criterion for a discipline's
entitlement to membership in the university community. When Langdell
asserted, therefore, that unless law was a science it could only be a
"handicraft" properly studied outside the university, he may have
accurately reflected the scientific bias of his historical "Darwinian"
moment but he clearly did not understand the intellectual and societal
traditions and characteristics of the university. 14
135. Farmer, supra note 23, at 3.
136. . NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNrVEpsnrY at xxvii (Longmans ed. 1947).
137. Id.
138. Madden, supra note 26, at vi (emphasis in original).
139. CAR.NEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 1; Farmer, supra note 23, at 3-8.
140. Langdell, supra note 90, at 124.
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Sorting out the ideal of the university is made even more difficult
when it is examined in the context of the American law school. The
difficulty is enhanced by several factors: (1) law faculty in America have
never understood, and rarely have even sought to understand, the real
nature of their institution; (2) law faculty have almost unquestioningly
accepted Langdell's flawed, incomplete, and superficial description of their
intellectual and pedagogical mission; (3) the effect of the law school's
relationship with the organized legal profession-as opportunity,
distortion, and constraint -has not been pursued adequately; and (4) the
fact that most law students are almost totally oriented toward a type of
learning they perceive as directly relevant to the practice of law, an
attitude condemned by Charles Eliot as inevitably tainting the spirit of the
university ideal, is known by all law faculty but conveniently ignored.
Consider, for example, the implications of the close relationship
between the law schools and the legal profession, including the extent to
which these links are capable of dominating the activities and orientations
of law faculty. A lawyer intimately involved in the process of ABA
accreditation of law schools has commented: "These interests of bench
and bar will not be dissipated by reason of being ignored, disdained, or
scorned by academicians . .

.

.Failure, or further protracted delay, in

establishment of workable relations will very likely exact of legal
education very high costs indeed." 141
The consequences of the relationship are reflected in Francis Allen's
concept of the scholarly role of law faculty: "The freedom of legal
education to devise its scholarly agenda . . .is the obverse side of its

obligations. The law schools are professional schools and, as such, are
obligated to advance the goals and capacities of the profession."'142
It was stated early in this Article that the law schools are caught
astride the chasm separating the Scylla of the university from the
Charybdis of the profession. The tension is enormous and ultimately
inescapable although I have attempted to describe how it can be
addressed. 143 It is against the fabric of this relationship that the question
of the faithfulness of clinical faculty to the university ideal must be
considered. When this is done the following conclusions emerge:
(1) In their teaching, clinical faculty focusing on themes of
justice, ethics, professional responsibility, and role have reopened
a line of pedagogy that ties them directly to the medieval ideals

141. Nahstoll, CurrentDilemmas in Law-SchoolAccreditation, 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 236,

238 (1982).
142. Allen, Legal Scholarship: Present Status and FutureProspects, 33 J.LEGAL EDUC.

403, 403 (1983).
143. See Prophets,supra note 16; The University Ideal, supra note 16.
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of the university, including the desire to teach the "esoteric
learning necessary to human social life and144necessary also to the
highest development of man as a person."'
(2) Focus by clinical faculty on the failures of political and legal
institutions to do justice or to fulfill their social obligations fits
into the functional ideal of the American university described by
the Carnegie Commission, particularly that of "[e]valuation of
society for self-renewal through individual thought and
persuasion." 145
(3) The themes of lawyer personality, integrity, principled
commitment, and humanistic inquiry are, both as teaching and
scholarly goals, unquestionably within the university tradition.
The fundamental themes of the modem clinical movement are more
faithful to the mainstream conceptions of the university ideal than was
much of the work done within the century-long paradigm generated by
Langdellian legal science, a flawed paradigm mitigated only slightly by the
emergence of Legal Realism. These conceptions tended to leave justice
and humanism out of their equations, producing stylized and sterile
approaches that were arguably unfaithful to the ideals of the university.
Fortunately, this has changed irrevocably, and a different, richer model of
the university law school is emerging through the interaction of varied
and creative approaches to scholarship and teaching. Unfortunately, it
cannot be said that clinical faculty are currently making much of a
positive contribution to the process of growth and transformation being
experienced by the law schools. If clinical faculty do not remove the
blinders of technique and pursuit of political power in the ABA/AALS
system, they will increasingly trivialize the clinical movement.
The new model of the university law school that is emerging will
never be free of its relation to the legal profession and judiciary, nor
should it be. The relationship will continue to define important aspects
of the university law school. This relationship is not illegitimate as long
as it is clearly understood, and recognized as a primary institutional
dynamic through which the university law schools can serve their
obligation to "speak truth to power."
The intellectual relationship between law faculty and the profession
includes the obligation to serve society through challenging and
questioning the abuses of the legal profession (and the judiciary) -far
more than simply "giving the profession what it wants." This is a

144. Farmer, supra note 23, at 3.
145. CARNFGIE COMMISSION, supra note 25, at 1.
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fundamental role for clinical faculty, one that simultaneously serves both
the proper interests of the legal profession and the university ideal. It is
a role consistent with that of European jurists in the formative period of
the law, and one that reflects the reality that "neither the bench nor the
bar has much of an incentive to do the hard thinking required to place
an individual case in a broad perspective -whether the perspective be
doctrinal, philosophical, historical, or economic in character." 146

146. Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.. 1131, 1139 (1981).

